博睿康6月11日获上交所科创板IPO受理，计划募资25亿元，目前处于问询阶段；据多家媒体报道，“杭州六小龙”中的强脑科技今年1月就以保密形式向港交所递交了上市申请，并与中金、瑞银合作筹备发行。

22.88亿对决！亚马尔2.92亿领跑，最贵阵超10亿，梅西无缘

10217 ★

摘要：一场「永无落幕的电影」当然，如果你和我一样是LABUBU的粉丝，我会推荐你另一种体验方式。

对于米兰而言，最优解是留下莱奥，让他在阿莫林体系里找回状态，继续承担进攻核心，但如果有符合预期的报价到来，卖掉莱奥回笼资金、配合新帅完成阵容重构，也不失为务实选择。

1、Kai云体育 “我们从小一起踢球，场上的默契源于场下的深厚友谊。

2017年，每周注射一次的司美格鲁肽（Ozempic）获批上市。Kai云体育阿浩去的那两家店，都开在2024年以前。

2、阿森纳官宣签下佐利斯，希腊边锋获赞数据亮眼，成特罗萨德替代者

阿莫林的三中卫体系对出球型中卫的传球成功率与推进能力提出了更高要求，而托莫里的出球一直是个问题。

3、集锦90秒、延迟12小时：FIFA极其严苛的版权保护正“反噬”世界杯

北京时间7月12日凌晨，历史上首次闯入世界杯八强的挪威将在美国硬石体育场迎战英格兰。

4、41岁的C罗虽老，但依然在葡萄牙作用明显

预计摩洛哥常规时间取胜的概率稍大，最可能的比分是1-0或2-1。

5、对话户外品牌：在媒介粉尘化时代，卖“场景”真比卖单品更香吗？

周远重新审视候选清单，逐渐把凸性来源分成了几类。

米歇尔在离开赫罗纳后接手了阿贾克斯的帅位，上赛季特尔施特根正是被租借到赫罗纳，在米歇尔麾下效力。

国内云厂商的DRAM采购有多少从三星和SK海力士转到了长鑫。

6、大暑｜世界杯后遗症还没消？熬乱的生物钟、抄错的球星餐，这份暑季攻略请收好

英格兰也借此拿下了季军，创造了近60年来的队史最佳战绩。

此前的纪录是三个，分别出现在1990年意大利世界杯（意大利、德国、阿根廷）和2006年德国世界杯（意大利、德国、法国）。

7、与前队友斗殴冲突，不满ESPY颁奖！NBA3届全明星中锋恐成众矢之的

法国队依靠姆巴佩、登贝莱等人的顶级个人能力，足以对中下游球队形成降维打击；但当面对西班牙这种整体性极强、球权控制力拉满的顶级技术流强队时，单兵作战的局限性便暴露无遗。

”即使不一定真便宜，小薇和很多年轻人表示，下次还是会去，而且每次都不会少买。

8、7尺9寸巨人开球，接球手仅5尺9寸，二人同框画面太震撼

长鑫科技7月27日上市，发行价为8.66元/股 7月23日，长鑫科技公告称，公司发行的人民币普通股股票将于2026年7月27日在上海证券交易所科创板上市。

靠着这套逻辑，这家机构已经投出了足球游戏公司Sorare、智能健康戒指Oura等多家独角兽项目，格列兹曼与英格兰球员埃里克·戴尔等约40位运动员一同成为这家机构的出资人。

论坛组织者是今年4月28日登陆港股、有“全球AI硅光芯片第一股”之称的曦智科技。

9、关于防范假冒“阳光高考”“阳光志愿”APP或小程序的声明

如今，西蒙尼对"球员+现金"的交换模式持开放态度，如果各方都能接受哲凯赖什作为添头，阿森纳拿下阿尔瓦雷斯的实际支出可能降至7000万英镑左右。

500万签名的狂欢与疑云：一场“输不起”的网络宣泄？该请愿网站的核心诉求直指国际足联（FIFA）和裁判，认为他们刻意偏袒梅西与阿根廷队，甚至声称“冠军已被提前内定”，要求取消阿根廷的参赛资格以保障赛事公平。

10、《将来进行时》（四）

2025-26赛季，他又经历了两次缺阵，一次肌肉问题，一次腿筋受伤。

在俱乐部层面，这种传承同样清晰可见：梅西在巴萨的早期岁月里曾穿过19号球衣，随后才接过象征核心的10号；而如今，亚马尔在巴萨同样继承了10号战袍，但在国家队，他依然选择穿着19号，仿佛在用这种方式向自己的偶像与宿命致敬。

1、28k英里2007款阿斯顿·马丁DB9 Volante：钨银色黑内，V12曾历事故修复

2023年11月，减肥版Zepbound获批。

2、尴尬！世界杯历史参赛队0球0积分球队只剩国足和印尼

无论是面对高压逼抢还是密集防守，法国队都能通过灵活的跑位与精准的传球，创造出绝佳的得分机会。

3、云南玉昆刚淘汰蓉城！叶楚贵就第一时间专门发文道歉，引发热议

然后是朗尼克，米兰目前的想法是让其出任技术总监，但不能完全排除主帅席位。希尔自曝左腿没力量，重返酋长传闻遭当头一棒加比亚若无法在出球环节完成升级，其主力席位大概率不保。

4、106分钟破门！替补亮相仅37秒即收奇效西班牙加时1-0阿根廷捧杯

储能成为增长新引擎 2026年上半年，中国储能电池出货量约485GWh，同比增长超80%。

5、世纪罕见！FIFA：美国前锋染红停赛缓期1年执行特朗普：不公被纠正

第16分钟，斯坦丘精准长传打穿防线，马莱莱扛住泰山中卫后横敲，阿奇姆彭冷静推射远角破门；仅仅6分钟后，泰山后卫解围拖沓，马莱莱高速跟进补射再下一城。

6、快讯丨西班牙vs阿根廷首发名单出炉！终局之战一触即发！

合同到期的弗拉霍维奇和莱万多夫斯基均具备自由签约的可能，但难度不可谓不大。

资料显示，去年WAIC期间，曦智科技曾发布基于dOCS分布式光交换模组的国内首个GPU光互连光交换超节点解决方案——光跃LightSphereX，并联合中兴通讯、壁仞科技首次进行示范应用，在上海仪电国产超节点算力集群落地，并在今年的论坛上进行了四方联合的落地成果发布仪式。

我在巴萨首秀时踢边后卫，而在国青队则司职中场，这也是我在梯队时的老本行。

7、18岁3000万镑！切尔西领跑新星争夺，世界杯远射后身价飙涨

至少，那些真正关心足球本身的人不想要。

另一方面，经销商为了完成销售指标，也只得以促销的方式清理库存方式，从而让耐克整体陷入价格战的泥潭，更拉低了耐克整个品牌的价位。

8、严重违纪违法，西藏自治区人大常委会原党组副书记、副主任王峻被“双开”

挪威典型的北欧球队，但他们有着矮个子边锋攻击群，因此进攻也有传控和脚下，甚至是具备的小快灵搭档高人哈兰德。

展会期间共有 65 项产品与技术首发，包括 23 项全球首发和 42 项国内首发。

荣耀首席AI科学家黄非说，Agentic OS的本质不是“在系统里加一个AI助手”，而是要重构一个以“意图”和“任务”为中心的新型操作系统。

【加拿大：边路狂飙的东道主】作为本届世界杯的东道主之一，加拿大全队总身价约2亿欧元，是南非的四倍多。

伊朗总统披露穆杰塔巴近况：“我们与敬爱的最高领袖之间的互动正日益增加，这样才能在他的指导下解决问题” 前NFL球员怒批巨人跑卫：场上场下都不成熟，“我不能像哄小孩一样哄你” 陈刚以不发通知、不打招呼、不听汇报、不用陪同接待，直奔基层、直插现场方式，到南宁市商场、矿山、民爆企业等督导检查安全生产工作 9440亿韩元分手费！韩国“最贵离婚案”宣判背后：AI牛市搅动，财阀股权格局受挑战

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（文｜出海参考，作者｜王璐，编辑｜罗文琴）Nextfin News — On July 22, latest research from Omdia showed that despite total market shipments dropping by over ten percent in the second quarter, Vivo—excluding its iQOO sub-brand—maintained its top position in the Indian smartphone market with 6.3 million units shipped. Yet despite its strength in the market, Vivo was unable to keep full control over its manufacturing plants in India. There is an unwritten law in the corporate world that market share acts as a moat and scale brings bargaining power. But in India, Vivo has just seen that principle turned on its head—and in a remarkably brutal fashion. On July 9, an official approval was finally granted. Dixon Technologies announced to the stock exchange that Vivo India received a clearance letter issued on July 8 by India’s Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade. Under this approval, the manufacturing operations Vivo built over twelve years in India will formally be folded into a joint venture controlled fifty-one percent by a local partner. According to industry analyses, the new entity has a paid-up capital of just fifty million rupees—around three and a half million yuan—yet it is taking over a mega-factory designed for an annual capacity of over one hundred million units and backed by a workforce of more than ten thousand employees. Viewed in isolation, this transaction reads like a story of loss. But when placed back into the context of Vivo’s global footprint, its true nature changes entirely. India remains Vivo’s largest overseas market, ranking first in 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, accounting for roughly one-third of the brand's total global volume. Overseas operations already contribute more than half of Vivo's global revenue, with targets set to raise that share to sixty percent this year and seventy percent by 2027. This shift in India does not merely affect a single regional market; it alters the structural load-bearing pillar of Vivo’s entire global strategy. With the Indian chapter coming to a close, Vivo now faces far more practical questions about its future: What exactly did this equity restructuring change, and how will the brand navigate its next phase of globalization? A Three-and-a-Half-Million Yuan Outlay for a Three-Hundred-Billion Revenue Business By securing a fifty-one percent controlling stake, Dixon leveraged its position to capture a cash cow with an annual revenue potential estimated between two hundred fifty billion and three hundred billion rupees—roughly twenty-one billion to twenty-five billion yuan. This revenue guidance originates directly from Dixon’s own management team. As early as May, Dixon founder Sunil Vachani revealed that the joint venture would handle approximately two-thirds of Vivo’s smartphone sales in India, representing over twenty million units annually. JPMorgan further projects that the joint venture will add around eleven million smartphone shipments in fiscal year 2027, scaling up to approximately twenty-two million units annually across fiscal years 2028 and 2029. From India's perspective, this outcome represents a decisive policy victory. Looking back at Vivo’s expansion abroad, its capital deployment in India consisted of substantial physical investments. According to an official press release issued by Vivo India in April 2023, the company outlined a total investment plan of seventy-five billion rupees. The first phase called for thirty-five billion rupees by the end of 2023, of which twenty-four billion had already been allocated alongside plans to inject an additional eleven billion rupees by year-end. The new facility in Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh, spans roughly 169 acres—a site acquired back in 2018 that officially went into operation in mid-2024. It currently holds an annual production capacity of sixty million units, with plans to double that figure to one hundred twenty million upon full completion, rivaling the footprint of Samsung’s largest manufacturing plant in the country. By 2018, Vivo's earlier facility was already generating a monthly output of around one million units while employing nearly ten thousand local workers. What do these figures truly signify? They demonstrate that Vivo was never just a consumer brand in India; it had built an end-to-end manufacturing system, a local supply chain, and a massive employment ecosystem. The company replicated its battle-tested Chinese ground-sales model across India, extending from major metropolitan shopping centers down to rural retail shops across roughly seventy thousand touchpoints. It even transformed India into an export hub, shipping Indian-made smartphones to Thailand and Saudi Arabia for the first time in 2022, with export targets exceeding one million units in 2023. Yet after 2024, every one of these capital investments transformed into a distinct disadvantage at the negotiating table. Faced with mounting regulatory pressure, Vivo initiated discussions in 2024 with major domestic players including Tata Group, Murugappa Group, and Dixon Technologies to explore joint ventures or contract manufacturing options, though early negotiations stalled. In December 2024, Vivo signed a non-binding term sheet with Dixon Technologies, initiating a protracted government approval process that dragged on for nineteen months. Upon closing, the joint venture will purchase selected manufacturing assets from Vivo for an undisclosed amount, sign dedicated production and packaging agreements with Vivo India, handle a substantial share of its OEM orders, and retain the flexibility to manufacture for third-party brands down the line. With an initial capital commitment of just 25.5 million rupees, Dixon gains access to established assembly lines, skilled workers, an integrated supply chain, and guaranteed orders from a brand selling over thirty million phones a year. In return, Vivo retains only the right to continue selling smartphones in the Indian market alongside a forty-nine percent financial yield on equity. Using a newly incorporated entity with a registered capital of merely fifty million rupees to take control of an advanced industrial plant capable of producing over one hundred million units annually is virtually unprecedented in global business history. Vivo understood the gravity of the concessions, but faced with severe regulatory constraints, it was left with few alternatives. Why Did Stronger Sales Lead to Heavier Constraints? Under standard market conditions, Vivo’s operational execution in India was textbook perfect. According to data from market research firm Omdia, Vivo—excluding iQOO—led the Indian smartphone market throughout 2025 with 32.1 million shipments and a twenty-one percent market share, marking a nineteen percent year-over-year growth rate. Samsung trailed in second place with twenty-three million units and a fifteen percent share. By the fourth quarter, Vivo widened its lead even further, shipping 7.9 million units in a single quarter to capture twenty-three percent of the market. Securing the top spot in the world's second-largest smartphone market—a region absorbing roughly one hundred fifty-four million devices annually—should have been a landmark corporate victory after twelve years of dedicated effort. However, as policy priorities shifted unexpectedly, the very capital-heavy assets Vivo spent years building transformed into immobilized leverage against the company. In April 2020, India enacted Press Note 3, requiring case-by-case government review for all direct foreign investments originating from countries sharing a land border. This rule effectively blocked capital injection channels for Chinese entities. Over the following years, regulatory scrutiny targeting Chinese smartphone manufacturers steadily intensified. In July 2022, authorities accused Vivo India of illicitly remitting 624.76 billion rupees back to China under the guise of tax avoidance. Vivo was hardly the only brand reshaped by this changing regulatory framework. Enforcement agencies froze 55.51 billion rupees of Xiaomi India’s assets in a dispute that remains unresolved; OPPO received a customs tax demand totaling 43.89 billion rupees; Transsion's manufacturing subsidiary, Ismartu India, surrendered a 50.1 percent controlling stake to Dixon; and HKC’s joint venture with Dixon was approved under a seventy-four to twenty-six equity structure. Faced with these conditions, Vivo was forced into a harsh binary choice: abandon its sunk costs and hand over billions of rupees in physical plants and distribution networks, or accept majority control by a local partner in exchange for permission to remain in the market. The restructuring struck directly at the primary engine of Vivo’s international business. India is not just another regional market for Vivo; it is its largest overseas pillar. In March of last year during the Boao Forum for Asia, Vivo COO Hu Baishan emphasized two key realities to Bloomberg: India is Vivo's most critical international market, and with overseas sales contributing over half of total revenues, the company is aiming for sixty percent in 2026 and seventy percent by 2027. In essence, the restructuring in India does not just adjust a local subsidiary; it alters the foundational premise of Vivo’s global expansion story. The "deep localization" playbook—building local plants, hiring local workforces, and cultivating local component ecosystems—long viewed as an ideal blueprint for overseas expansion, saw its ownership structure unilaterally rewritten in its most prominent market. Without Direct Plant Ownership in India, How Will Vivo Secure One-Third of Its Global Footprint? From a strategic standpoint, Vivo officially characterizes its international methodology as "More Local, More Global." The strategy relies on manufacturing localization through plants in markets like India and Brazil; marketing localization via major cultural partnerships ranging from the Indian Premier League to official sponsorships at the UEFA European Championship; and channel localization by exporting its field-sales distribution networks. The effectiveness of this approach is undeniable, as evidenced by Vivo holding the top market position in both India and Indonesia. Yet Vivo’s challenges in India expose the inherent vulnerabilities of this model: an over-concentration in specific regional markets and the property-rights risk associated with capital-heavy physical infrastructure. Pushing "More Local" to its logical extreme means anchoring factories, workforces, and supply chain assets entirely within foreign legal jurisdictions. Under favorable conditions, these assets form competitive barriers; during regulatory shifts, they turn into operational exposure. The deeper Vivo planted its roots in India over twelve years, the less leverage it retained during structural negotiations. Another challenge lies in Vivo's limited footprint across premium segments and developed Western markets. In discussions with Bloomberg, Hu Baishan noted that Vivo has paused expansion into developed regions like the United States and Western Europe, where carrier channels and Apple hold dominant positions, preferring instead to consider entering via new product categories over a three-to-five-year horizon. In India, the focus shifts toward expanding presence in the premium segment above six hundred dollars. In short, Vivo’s international expansion remains focused primarily on mid-to-entry segments across emerging markets, offering thinner profit margins. A six percent decline in Southeast Asian regional shipments in 2025 serves as a clear reminder of these market dynamics. So where does the company go from here? Part of the answer is already visible in Vivo’s recent strategic adjustments. First, Vivo is reframing its presence in India, shifting from a direct asset-owning manufacturer to a brand, technology, and distribution coordinator. This setup preserves market share, protects cash flow, maintains a forty-nine percent financial yield, and allows its premium product plans to proceed as intended. This structural pivot is not mere external speculation; it is explicitly defined by the mechanics of the joint venture agreement. According to regulatory filings submitted by Dixon, the joint venture is mandated to carry out three specific operational functions: acquire selected manufacturing assets from Vivo, execute contract manufacturing and packaging agreements with Vivo India, and fulfill OEM orders—initially covering roughly two-thirds of Vivo’s local sales volume before opening up capacity to third-party brands. In other words, the joint venture functions as a contract manufacturer, while product R&D, branding, pricing strategy, and retail distribution remain controlled by Vivo India. Holding a forty-nine percent equity stake, Vivo transitions to an equity accounting model rather than full revenue consolidation while retaining proportional board representation to safeguard its governance voice. Simply put: manufacturing operations transfer to a locally controlled partner, while the commercial brand and retail business remain firmly in Vivo's hands. Maintaining market leadership, preserving operational cash flow, and collecting a forty-nine percent share of manufacturing profits represents a practical compromise designed to minimize disruption. Second, Vivo is actively establishing a multi-hub manufacturing and brand strategy. In late May 2025, Vivo launched its product line in São Paulo, Brazil, under the Jovi sub-brand name. Because the "Vivo" trademark was already registered by local telecom operator Telefônica, the company adapted by entering under an alternate brand identity. Manufacturing was assigned to a local partner, GBR, with production lines established in the Manaus Free Trade Zone that went operational in January 2025. Complemented by established market positions in Colombia, Chile, and Peru, Latin America is emerging as Vivo's next core strategic region. The Brazilian operating model serves as a template tailored for the post-India era: brand names can adapt, manufacturing can be outsourced to regional assembly partners, and market entry moves forward without exposing heavy physical assets to single-jurisdiction legal risk. The experience in India delivers a clear lesson on corporate asset ownership: deep operational localization alone is no longer an absolute defense, making governance structure and geographic diversification essential indicators of long-term resilience.7月24日，旭阳新材IPO即将上会。

30岁！28岁！阿根廷不被看好有2点原因，梅西进8球却成“双刃剑”

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